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Introduction 
Increasing awareness of environmental problems over the past few decades has resulted in a 
larger focus on environmental taxes as a means to correct negative externalities. To illustrate 
the extent of environmental tax reforms as part of the general policy focus on environmental 
protection, Eurostat, OECD and IEA have established routines for the collection of data on 
the magnitude of environmental taxes in terms of tax revenues (Eurostat 2001, OECD 2009). 
This information is seen as important indicators for the development of environmental 
protection over time and across countries, and is used in areas such as environmental policy 
and fiscal policy and reform, as well as for analytical purposes.  
The measurement of environmental taxes is not straightforward. All taxes are principally 
justified in market failures, distributional or revenue concerns, and environmental taxes are 
clearly defined in economic theory. In practice, however, each political target involves several 
types of instruments, and each instrument is often designed to achieve several targets (Bye 
and Bruvoll 2008). Also, the presence of both environmental and fiscal taxes influences the 
optimal tax structure (Sandmo 1975). When moving from theory to the implemented taxes, 
the entanglement of instruments complicates the calculation of the environmental elements as 
share of total taxes on polluting goods. As a consequence of practical problems and political 
desire to appear environmentally friendly, taxes may be described and incorrectly named as 
environmental despite low or no environmental externalities. What is called environmental 
taxes may in practice include fiscal elements, and vice versa. 
These definition problems characterize the official international statistics. Due to problems 
with defining objective and comparable databases, the international statistics developed by 
Eurostat, OECD and IEA (Eurostat 2001) are not based on a theoretical definition of 
environmental taxes. Instead, the official statistics cover all environmentally related taxes; i.e. 
taxes related to energy, transport and pollution, as well as taxes levied on resources. If we 
take environmentally related as a literal classification, it would in principle extend to every 
type of tax, as all taxes affect economic activity which in turns affects the use of energy, 
environment and other externalities.  
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Hence, to interpret the statistics as environmental taxes is misleading, as it clearly includes 
other elements such as fiscal taxes and resource rents. Even though the Eurostat et al. 
framework use the term environmentally related taxes in their original definition, their official 
figures are presented and interpreted as environmental taxes (see e.g. European Environment 
Agency 2005, OECD 2006, Eurostat 2008). This forms the public opinion on the ranking of 
the environmentally friendly policies across countries on a faulty basis. As scientists 
seemingly presume that the concept of environmental taxes corresponds to a theoretically 
consistent definition, the data base is used to analyze a range of problems, e.g. the effect of 
environmental taxes on economic growth (Morley 2009), cultural differences as an 
explanation to the acceptance of environmental taxes (Sterner and Köhlin 2003) and the 
development in environmental taxes over time in and between countries (Ekins 1999). 
Consequently, scientist may draw misleading conclusions on the causes and effects of 
environmental policy. 
In this article, we discuss the separation of environmental taxes from other taxes in light of tax 
theory and present a theoretically consistent guideline of how to calculate the environmental 
tax elements. To study the statistical measurement problem empirically, we compare the 
environmental taxes based on the theoretical definition with the internationally reported 
environmentally related taxes as defined by Eurostat (2001). We find that the international 
figures include tax bases far beyond the environmental elements, and that the lack of 
theoretical foundation for the international figures involves several limitation and 
interpretation problems. Steps should be taken to harmonize the calculation of environmental 
taxes with economic theory.  
Theoretical framework 
An environmental tax is a type of Pigouvian taxes (Pigou 1920, Sandmo 1975), which are 
levied to correct the marginal effects of negative externalities. An optimal environmental tax 
should be levied directly at the externality, and equals marginal damage cost (MDC) of the 
emission. Environmental taxes serve two purposes. First, the taxes give cost efficient emission 
reductions when the marginal abatement cost is below the tax level. Second, the polluters pay 
the cost of the remaining emissions. This payment corresponds to the environmental tax 
revenue, as is the focus of this article.  
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The size of the revenue does not carry any information about emission changes resulting from 
the tax. In some cases, an environmental tax may have virtually no effect on emissions. For 
instance, given current price levels, the CO2 tax on petrol has very little effect on transport 
volumes (cf. e.g. OECD 2006). But the tax is still an environmental tax, and ensures the 
polluter pays principle.  
In the real world, environmental taxes are just part of the overall tax system. The main reason 
for levying taxes is to raise revenue for publicly provided goods, i.e. fiscal taxes. To avoid 
market distribution leading to deadweight losses, fiscal taxes should be levied where they are 
least likely to distort economic activity. The standard theory of optimal taxation is based on 
Ramsey (1927). Under simplifying assumptions, e.g. disregarding externalities, Ramsey 
showed that the fiscal tax rate on a good should be inversely proportional to the 
corresponding own price elasticity of demand.  
When both fiscal and Pigouvian taxes exist, i.e. for polluting goods, the optimal taxes will not 
simply be the sum of the MDC and the Ramsey tax (Sandmo 1975, 2000). As shown by 
Sandmo, the optimal tax rates are weighted averages of that computed under the Ramsey 
inverse elasticity rule and the Pigouvian marginal social damage. Formally, let the weights be 
a and (1-a), and TR the tax rate that maximizes the governmental revenue (i.e. the inverse 
elasticity). The optimal tax rate to the good then becomes:  
[1]  T = a TR + (1-a) MDC   0 < a < 1 
The first element reflects the fiscal element, while the second element reflects the Pigou 
element. The magnitude of the parameter a should reflect the tightness of the government’s 
budget constraint or the marginal cost of public funds (Sandmo 2000). This will vary between 
taxes and goods. The results of Sandmo are important to the interpretation of the size use of 
environmental taxes. When decomposing the total revenue from the tax on a polluting good, 
each ascribed part will be equal to or lower than the respective optimal fiscal and Pigouvian 
taxes. The higher is the government’s budget requirement, the less is the weight of the 
environmental element. Hence, the environmental tax element is only a share (1-a) of 
Pigouvian tax: 
[2]  Environmental tax = (1-a) MDC < MDC 
6 
Measuring environmental taxes in practice 
The theoretical framework refers to an optimal situation where the optimal value of a is a 
simple function of the shadow prices on the public and the private budget constraints. Thus, a 
is the same for all goods and tax rates. In practice, the formulation of the tax system generally 
deviates from the theoretical framework due to market failures, conflicting political stands, 
pressure groups and other considerations than pure efficiency concerns. It is then not clear 
how one should decompose an observed tax rate into a fiscal contribution and the MDC. This 
is not an argument against using the general principles underlying the optimal tax structure as 
guidelines when evaluating the actual tax structure. It is hard to see how one can avoid some 
arbitrariness in the evaluations when using a theoretically optimal structure as a reference for 
the evaluation. The weighted average in [1] should be regarded as one such principle. 
Moreover, as this paper demonstrates, one can derive policy relevant conclusions concerning 
the actual tax structure without knowledge about the weights. 
For the values of MDC, environmental economics theory has developed several methods for 
estimating environmental externalities (see e.g. Pearce and Turner 1990). As the values 
cannot be observed in the market, the estimates are only approximations to the true shadow 
prices, and they will vary depending upon the estimation method.  
Given that optimal weight of the value of a for practical purposes is unknown, and that the 
implemented taxes are not well defined, there is a need for some principal guidelines as a 
basis for the calculations of the environmental tax elements [2].  
We separate between two different cases. The first case is when the tax rate is set lower than 
T*, the second when the tax rate is set higher than T*, T* being the optimal tax rate where T = 
MDC. 
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When T = Tl < T*, the tax is lower than marginal damage at the actual emission level, Tl < 
MDC’. This case is illustrated in figure 1 under the general assumptions of increasing 
marginal abatement costs and increasing marginal damage costs. Defining the entire revenue 
as environmental tax revenue is a strong assumption. This would imply that the marginal cost 
of fund is zero (a=0) and hence the Ramsey tax is zero in an optimal tax system. In practice, 
fiscal taxes are added to most Pigou taxes, and as shown in [2] the environmental tax element 
is lower than MDC at the actual emission level. Principally, it could even be lower than Tl. If 
the revenue from the tax Tl is used as an estimate on the environmental tax element, it must be 
interpreted as an estimate for the maximal environmental tax revenue.  
 
Externality Abatement
Marginal 
damage cost
MDC
Tax revenue
Tl
E0
Marginal 
abatement cost
MAC
Figure 1. Tax lower than marginal damage cost                   
Tax,T
T*
MDC’
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When T = Th > T*, the tax is higher than the marginal damage, Th >MDC’’, see figure 2. Then 
the revenue obviously includes more than the optimal Pigouvian tax equaling the marginal 
damage cost. Contrary to what may be perceived as standard intuition, part of the total 
revenue, i.e. at least Th – MDC’’, is to be classified as fiscal and subtracted from the revenue 
even if the tax is levied on an externality.  
The next question is how much more should be subtracted to be ascribed to the fiscal element. 
As long as a in practice is unknown, we do not get more help from theory. As in the example 
above, to define the entire MDC’’ as the environmental tax is rather radical, since that implies 
that the marginal cost of fund (a) is zero, cf. [2].  
Using MDC is hence to be interpreted as an estimate for the maximal environmental tax 
revenue. 
 
Externality Abatement
Marginal 
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T*
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to MDC
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E0
Marginal 
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Figure 2. Tax higher than marginal damage cost                  
Tax,T
 
To summarize, we recommend that existing estimates on the marginal damage costs MDC are 
used as estimates of the maximum potential environmental taxes. When the tax rates are 
higher than the MDCs, the difference should be subtracted from the revenue.  
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The international approximation to environmental taxes 
Attempts have been made to compare the magnitude of environmental taxes in terms of tax 
revenues for several years (OECD 2006, Eurostat 2008). The guidelines are based on a 
statistics framework devised in 1997 by Eurostat, OECD and IEA (Eurostat 2001), referred to 
hereafter as the “Eurostat et al. definition”. Varying definitions across countries and the 
complications in separating the environmental elements from the other taxes have influenced 
the guidelines for the collection of data. Consistency between national accounts and 
comparisons of environmental data was emphasized, in order to draw the data from the 
countries’ national accounts. Consequently, practical concerns have separated the guidelines 
from stringent definitions of environmental taxes based on economic theory. Rather, Eurostat 
et al. “decided to focus on the tax bases that have a particular environmental relevance, and 
to consider all taxes levied on these tax bases as environmental” (Eurostat 2001).  
The Eurostat et al. definition of an “environmentally related tax” is “A tax whose tax base is a 
physical unit (or a proxy of it) of something that has a proven, specific negative impact on the 
environment. It was decided to include all taxes on energy and transport in the definition of 
environmental taxes. Value added type taxes are excluded from the definition (Eurostat 2001). 
A more specified list of tax bases is included in the guidelines (see Appendix).  
This definition covers principally any form of economic activity. All manufacturing requires 
factor inputs with negative environmental impact, and all taxes and charges will affect 
emissions by equilibrium effects. Hence, it is difficult to interpret these data, and in particular 
they cannot be taken as any reliable indicator of the use of environmental taxes, as the 
appellation “environmentally related” indicates. 
The Eurostat et al. specified list of tax bases to be included (see Appendix) raises several 
questions. According to the Eurostat et al. definition above, all taxes on tax bases with a 
negative impact on the environment should be included, regardless if the taxes are fiscally 
motivated. In line with many of the taxes included in the Eurostat et al. definition, the fiscal 
value added taxes (VATs) on environmentally damaging products contribute to reduce supply 
of the products, and VATs on for example fossil fuels has the same kind of effect as the CO2 
tax on petrol. Hence, according to Eurostat et al.s basic definition, VATs and the 
environmental taxes should be equivalently treated. Still, an exception is made for the VATs 
by excluding them from the definition, not because they are fiscal taxes as would follow the 
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theoretical principles outlined above, but because “they do not influence relative prices in the 
same way as other taxes on environmentally related tax bases” (Eurostat 2001). Notably, 
some VAT rates are also designed to influence environmental behavior. For instance, in 
Austria and Spain VAT it is higher on motor vehicles than other goods, and many of the 
fiscally motivated transport taxes included in the Eurostat et al. definition vary according to 
emissions. 
Further, the Eurostat et al. definition includes taxes on resources. Resource taxes are usually 
imposed to tax economic rents on the extraction of natural resources (Ricardo rents, Hotelling 
rents and monopoly rents), they are not directed towards externalities. Neither do the resource 
taxes affect the extraction of the natural resources or are intended to do so. Hence, resource 
taxes should not be included in a measure of environmental taxes. Eurostat questions whether 
resource extraction is environmentally harmful in itself, though argue that it can lead to 
environmental problems, and concludes that this is sufficient reason to warrant its inclusion in 
the tax base (Eurostat 2001). This seems like an arbitrary argument.  
In other cases, exceptions are made. Taxes on resources like oil and gas are excluded, as is the 
natural resource tax imposed on for instance Norwegian hydro power. Eurostat justify this by 
invoking the wide variation in revenue from taxing oil and gas and between national tax 
systems. This also seems like a rather arbitrary argument, and consequently, data is adjusted 
to avoid variation and to avoid that the revenues from some taxes exceed a certain size. This 
contrasts the purpose of estimating and comparing environmental taxes, which is to illuminate 
the variation in the use of instruments between countries and over time. These are examples 
of exceptions and lack of consistency that introduce interpretation and comparability 
problems.  
It is an empirical question whether the international data following the Eurostat et al. 
definition is close to the actual environmental taxes. As argued above, the MDC estimates 
provide the maximum estimates of environmental taxes. If the reported taxes according to the 
Eurostat guidelines are significantly higher than this maximum measure, we may reject the 
international definition as an approximation to environmental taxes.  
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Environmental taxes compared with the Eurostat et al. definition  
To investigate this matter, we calculate the environmental taxes and compare them with the 
taxes following the Eurostat et al. definition. Table 1 shows these numbers, using Norway as a 
case. We estimate the environmental taxes in 2007 to nearly 1700 million euro. The taxes 
following the Eurostat et al. definition and reported to the Eurostat/IEA/OECD database 
amount to 8200 million euro (Næss and Smith 2009).  
Table 1. Real revenues from Norwegian environmental taxes and compared with revenues 
according to the Eurostat et al. definition, million Euro, 2007 
 
Real 
environmental  
tax revenues 
Eurostat et al. 
tax revenues
Total 1666 8228
 
Taxes on Greenhouse 
gases  
    Tax on CO2 emissions from petroleum activity on the continental shelf 310 422
    CO2 tax on mineral products 409 558
    Tax on greenhouse gases HFC and PFC 28 28
    Tax on final treatment of waste - CH4 element 17 85
 
Other environmental 
taxes 
    Petrol tax - environmental element 366 1015
    Diesel tax - environmental element 289 802
    Tax on final treatment of waste - other pollutants 12 0
    Sulfur tax on mineral products 14 16
    Tax on NOX emissions in the petroleum sector 61 61
    Tax on NOX emissions 89 89
    Tax on pesticides, trichloroethane and tetrachloroethane 9 9
    Taxes on beverage containers 60 60
Other taxes reported by Eurostat:  
    Motor vehicle registration tax  2827
    Re-registration tax on motor vehicles  271
    Annual motor vehicle tax   1012
    Annual weight based tax on motor vehicles  44
    Electricity consumption tax  748
    Tax on mineral oils  85
    Tax on lubricating oil   11
    Base tax on disposable beverage packaging   83
 
12 
The starting point for analyzing the Norwegian environmental taxes was all special duties1. 
We evaluated all these in light of the theoretical principles discussed above and existing 
marginal damage cost estimates.  
Taxes on greenhouse gases 
In Norway, taxes on CO2 are levied on emissions from petroleum activity on the continental 
shelf, and on mineral products. In line with the theoretical discussion above, we use the 
marginal damage costs as estimates for the environmental element in the revenues from CO2 
taxes. Due to the nature of the problem of global warming, the MDC estimates are subject to 
particular uncertainty and variability. Using the price for emission permits in a carbon quota 
market is one approximation. Another estimate of the MDC could be the CO2 tax. In practice, 
also this tax is highly differentiated, despite that the marginal damage is independent of 
source. For a large proportion of the sources for CO2 emissions in Norway, the taxes are 
excessive relative to a cost-effective system determined by the market price of emission 
permits. As pointed out by Bruvoll and Larsen (2004), the highest tax rates are levied at tax 
bases with limited effect, while the sectors where the taxes would have been efficient are 
exempted. This indicates a heavy emphasis on the fiscal element for some emission sources, 
while the fiscal element is zero for other.  
We have used 25 euros per tonne CO2 as an estimate. This is in line with both the highest 
price of emission permits in the European Trading System in 2007 (www.pointcarbon.com), 
and the average Norwegian CO2 tax, see Bruvoll and Dalen (2009). Bruvoll and Dalen (2008) 
calculate the average excessive fiscal component at 27 percent of the revenue from the 
Norwegian CO2 taxes. Hence, we define 73 percent of the taxes on CO2 as environmental 
taxes, amounting to 720 million euro. This should be interpreted as the upper boundary of the 
uncertainty interval at the given MDC estimate for climate gas emissions. The Eurostat 
statistics includes the entire revenue from the CO2 taxes, amounting to nearly 10 billion euro, 
see table 1. 
The taxes on the greenhouse gases HFCs and PFCs accord approximately to the same level as 
the average CO2 tax, the highest level of the ETS price, and hence the MDC estimate for 
                                                     
1 An environmental tax is a type of special duty. Special duties include environmental taxes, fiscally warranted special duties 
and taxes created for specific goods to reduce consumption. Indirect taxes include in addition to special duties VAT and 
customs duty. Source: Ministry of Finance (2007). 
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climate gas emissions as used for CO2. The full revenue is thus included in our calculation. 
This corresponds to the Eurostat et al. estimate. 
The taxes imposed on the final treatment of waste are intended to price the environmental 
costs of waste treatment, including the greenhouse gas CH4, and to increase recycling and 
reduce waste amounts (Ministry of Finance 2007). The tax on landfills does not target the 
pollution but the amount of waste. Over the past few years, emissions per tonne of waste have 
fallen rapidly, but the tax per tonne of waste has remained the same without being adjusted 
according to theory. The marginal damage costs are estimated to be less than 25 per cent of 
the deposit tax (Bruvoll and Dalen 2008, Ministry of Finance 2007). We hence define the 
remaining as fiscal. The Eurostat et al. definition includes the entire revenue from these taxes, 
see table 1. 
Other environmental taxes 
The taxes on petrol and diesel fuel define usage-dependent external costs except climate gas 
emissions (Ministry of Finance 2007). The taxes include the cost of road usage and accidents 
in addition to environmental costs. The Eurostat et al. definition includes the entire revenue 
from these taxes. But to isolate the environmental component, the revenue related to road use 
and accident costs, and other non-environmental components should be subtracted. According 
to ECON (2003) and Ministry of Finance (2007), the marginal costs related to local emissions 
account for 8 per cent and noise for 28 per cent of the revenue from these taxes2. Using these 
estimates, we classify 36 per cent of the petrol and diesel fuel tax as environmental taxes.  
The tax on waste incineration is adjusted to correspond to the estimated environmental 
damage (Ministry of Finance 2007). Hence, we define it an environmental tax. This is in 
accordance with the Eurostat et al. definition. 
The sulfur tax on mineral products addresses environmental externalities associated with acid 
rain. Relative to the target set in the Gothenburg Protocol, the tax is 13 per cent higher than 
the necessary marginal abatement cost (Ministry of Finance 2007), cf. figure 2. We have 
corrected the revenue for this, while Eurostat et al. include the entire revenue. 
                                                     
2 Price adjusted to 2007-level. The estimates for external costs for petrol fuel vehicles are used also for diesel fuel vehicles. 
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The taxes on emissions of NOx address environmental externalities arising from NOx 
emissions. The taxes are designed to meet agreed targets under the Gothenburg Protocol. The 
taxes are lower than estimated optimal tax to reach the emission target, t < MDC, cf. figure 1. 
Hence, we use the total revenue from these taxes as an estimate of environmental taxes on 
NOx. 
The taxes on pesticides, trichloroethylene and tetrachloroethylene address health and 
environmental costs. The Ministry of Finance considers that the taxes have contributed to 
fulfill its intentions with respect to emission reductions, cf. a reduction to the optimal level at 
MDC=MAC in the figures above. Hence, we define these taxes as environmental taxes. 
The taxes on beverage containers are intended to price the environmental costs of such 
containers that end up as waste in the natural environment. According to Raadal et al. (2003), 
differentiation by type of material reflects the environmental costs. Hence, we consider the 
taxes as estimates for environmental taxes. 
Other taxes included in the Eurostat et al. definition 
We estimate that almost 6600 million euro of the taxes included in the Eurostat et al. 
definition are not environmental taxes according to theory, see table 1. As discussed so far, 
compared to Eurostat we have excluded the fiscal elements related to the taxes on CO2 
emissions from petroleum activity on the continental shelf and mineral products, final 
treatment of waste, petrol and diesel fuels, and sulfur.  
Some other tax bases are excluded from our definition in their entirety. The first four we 
mention are related to the transport sector, see table 1. The most important is the motor 
vehicles registration tax. The original purpose of this tax was to create revenue for the state. It 
is also progressive to address distributive considerations, though commercial vehicles are 
exempt, and differentiated on the basis of CO2 emissions. While it is based on a criterion 
which would suggest an environmental impact, this is not sufficient to justify the tax as an 
environmental, i.e. Pigouvian, tax. As argued above, in principle all instruments influence the 
emissions through the equilibrium effects in the economy. First, to be defined a Pigouvian 
tax, the tax should be levied as close as possible at the externality, i.e. in this case at the 
emission or the fuel. The fact that the registration tax may slow the renewal of the car fleet, 
and hence increase pollution is a reminder of the necessity of a theoretical basis for the 
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definition of environmental taxes. Second, the externalities related to transport are already 
internalized in the emission taxes mentioned above. Defining more taxes on the same 
externalities as environmental would imply a double counting. Hence, the motor vehicles 
registration tax is not to be considered an environmental tax.  
Likewise, the re-registration tax on motor vehicles is independent of usage and has no direct 
connection with the emissions from transport. The annual tax on motor vehicles is higher for 
vehicles without particle filters, but is also independent of usage. The annual weight based tax 
on motor vehicles is intended to price local emissions and road wear. However, this is also a 
usage-independent tax, and it is not suited to correct usage-dependent external costs. These 
taxes will therefore not price road wear or local emissions correctly. In addition, the emissions 
from transport are already internalized in the carbon taxes and the taxes on petrol and diesel 
fuels. Hence, we do not consider these taxes as environmental.  
The taxes associated with the transport sector amount to nearly 4200 million euro and 
represent the key source of error in the Eurostat et al. definition, cf. our estimate of the 
environmental taxes to 1700 million euro. Rather than adjusting for environmental 
externalities, the taxes are intended to fund infrastructure. The cost of road construction varies 
widely, compare mountainous countries as Norway and Switzerland with the flat terrain in 
Denmark and the north of Germany. Given that these taxes reflect infrastructure costs, these 
taxes would vary, without indicating differences in environmental priorities. Rather, 
increasing transport taxes to fund infrastructure may entail increased emissions from transport 
and a less environmentally friendly policy. 
According to the Eurostat et al. definition, the entire electricity consumption tax on electric 
power is counted as an environmentally related tax. The political motivation is environmental 
and fiscal concerns, in addition to being an energy policy instrument (Ministry of Finance 
2004). The tax is levied on the consumption of power. With the exception of some reports of 
el-allergy, its consumption has no known adverse environmental effect, and the consumption 
tax has therefore no environmental justification. On the other hand, the production of power 
does affect the environment. 100 per cent of Norwegian electricity production is 
hydroelectricity and wind power. Negative domestic externalities are associated with the 
construction and running of hydro-electric and wind power plants. The environmental impacts 
associated with constructing hydro-electric and wind power plants are addressed by the terms 
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of the development concession agreement, conservation plans and general water systems 
plans. They cover in addition the environmental consequences of production, such as rotating 
windmills and reservoir drain down. Apart from these examples, it is difficult to spot negative 
environmental effects of domestic power generation. When importing electricity to Norway, 
CO2 emissions and local pollution from coal-fired power plants may increase abroad. The 
responsibility for these emissions lies with the Swedish and Danish emissions accounting 
systems, the environmental policies and climate agreements in these countries.  
We thus conclude that the electricity consumption tax does not correct any environmental 
externalities. This tax is another example of the importance of following theoretical principles 
when defining concepts. Instead of being a Pigouvian tax, the electricity consumption tax may 
have the opposite function. As Norwegian power production is emission free, the power tax 
principally encourages substitution to fossil based heating sources and hence increased 
emissions. The tax could also lead to lower producer prices and lower profitability in the 
development and use of new, emission-free technologies.  
The tax on mineral oils was introduced to prevent substituting oil for electric power. The tax 
is not imposed on the emissions, which would follow from the general principle of taxation, 
or determined on the basis of specified emissions. As a tax on fossil fuel emissions, it 
represents a double taxation, since the emissions are already regulated by taxes mentioned 
above. We follow the judgment of the Ministry of Finance (2007), that it should be 
considered in the way as the consumption tax on electric power, namely as a fiscal tax.  
The tax on lubricating oils is not imposed on emissions from the use of such oils but is 
intended to fund a collection system and responsible handling of oil waste. Then, it should be 
considered a charge, covering the costs of abated emissions, not an environmental tax, 
covering the costs of the remaining emissions. It is hence intended to cover the abatement 
costs, not the emissions costs, cf. the figures above. 
The reason behind base tax on disposable beverage packaging is the view that reuse is more 
environmentally friendly than recycling materials. According to Ministry of Finance (2007), 
there is little or no evidence of this, and it could even distort competition, and should 
therefore be withdrawn. Hence, this is not an environmental tax. 
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Figure 3. Norwegian special duties, 2007
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Using Norwegian taxes as an example, we find that about 20 percent of the tax revenues 
following the principles outlined by Eurostat, IEA and OECD are environmental taxes, see 
figure 3. Estimating the use of environmental taxes and revenues requires careful examination 
of the set of special duties in light of tax theory, and detailed evaluation of each of the tax 
systems in all the countries over the entire data period.  
Concluding remarks  
In this article, we have discussed the theoretical basis for how to measure the use of 
environmental taxes. The optimal environmental tax, the Pigouvian tax, equals the marginal 
damage cost. We argue that when the tax rates on externalities are set higher than the 
marginal damage costs, the difference should be subtracted from the tax. And contrary to 
standard approximation, the environmental tax element is generally even lower than the 
Pigouvian tax in the presence of fiscal taxes.  
We compare the theoretical approximation to the international framework defined by 
Eurostat, OECD and IEA (Eurostat 2001) for calculation of environmentally related taxes. 
The Eurostat et al. definition includes taxes related to environment, energy and transport 
together and hence aggregates fiscal taxes and environmental taxes in terms of a common 
measure. Even though the Eurostat et al. framework uses the term environmentally related 
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taxes in their original definition, the term environmental taxes is used in reports of the 
international statistics (e.g. in European Environment Agency 2005, Eurostat 2008). This creates 
misleading interpretation to the users of the data.  
Our empirical examination illustrates that even with a stringent definition based on theory, 
subjective judgments are hard to avoid when separating environmental taxes from other taxes. 
Even with a wide uncertainty interval, our comparisons with the environmental tax revenues 
following the theoretical definition shows that the Eurostat et al. definition is too wide to 
indicate the variation in environmental taxes. The perspective on the extent of environmental 
taxation in OECD is thus highly overrated. Consequently, scientists using the data may draw 
misleading conclusions on the causes and effects of environmental policy (see e.g. Morley 
2009, Ekins 1999, Sterner and Köhlin 2003, OECD 2006) and the public is presented faulty 
information on the ranking of environmentally friendly policies over time and across 
countries. To improve the statistical framework of the reports on environmental taxes, the 
international guidelines should be revised based on economic theory. 
Finally, it is debatable what information these tax revenues can offer, even if they are 
correctly calculated. A tax revenue is the product of the tax rate and the emission. Revenue 
growth could result from increasing awareness of the value of the environment (i.e., more or 
higher taxes), or from growth in emissions due to less stringency in environmental 
regulations. Also, if the elasticity of the emission with respect to the environmental tax is 
higher than one, the environmental tax revenue will increase as a result of lower 
environmental taxes3. It is then an open question whether revenue growth indicates a more or 
less environmentally friendly policy stance. Changes in the formulation of the tax systems 
may also give misleading signals. E.g. a switch from taxation to a quota system and emission 
permit trading will reduce the revenue from taxes, without having any practical impact on 
emissions or climate policy priorities. 
Another problem is the interpretation of the tax revenues presented as percentages of gross 
domestic product, or as percentages of all taxes and charges (see, for instance, OECD 2006, 
Eurostat 2008). Falling tax shares could simply result from an increase in GDP without 
indicating any changes in political priorities. The revenue could also be influenced by 
                                                     
3 The environmental tax revenue R equals the tax t times the emission E(t). R’(t) > 0 only if |(δE/E)(δt/t)| < 1 
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adjustments in other parts of the tax system or structural changes in the economy, while 
keeping environmental policy unchanged. Rather, the variation in overall tax levels across 
countries partly expresses distributive policy priorities and the size of the public sector.  
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Appendix:  
The Eurostat (2001) “Tax bases included in the environmental tax statistics framework”: 
 
Measured or estimated emissions to air 
- Measured or estimated NOx emissions 
- SO2 content of fossil fuels 
- Other measured or estimated emissions to air 
Ozone depleting substances (e.g. CFC or halon) 
Measured or estimated effluents to water  
- Measured or estimated effluents of oxydizeable matters (BOD, COD) 
- Other measured or estimated effluents to water 
- Effluent collection and treatment, fixed annual taxes 
Certain non-point sources of water pollution  
- Pesticides (Based on e.g. chemical content, price or volume) 
- Artificial fertilisers (Based e.g. on phosphorus or nitrogen content or price) 
- Manure 
Waste management 
- Waste management in general (e.g. collection or treatment taxes) 
- Waste management, individual products (e.g. packaging, beverage containers) 
Noise (e.g. aircraft take-off and landings) 
Energy products  
- Energy products used for transport purposes 
- Unleaded petrol 
- Leaded petrol 
- Diesel 
- Other energy products for transport  purposes (e.g. KPG or natural gas) 
- Energy products used for stationary purposes 
- Light fuel oil 
- Heavy fuel oil 
- Natural gas 
- Coal 
- Coke 
- Biofuels 
- Other fuels for stationary use 
- Electricity consumption 
- Electricity production 
- District heat consumption 
- District heat production 
Transport 
- Motor vehicles, one-off import or sales taxes 
- Registration or use of motor vehicles, recurrent (e.g. yearly) taxes 
Resources 
- Water abstraction 
- Extraction of raw materials (except oil and gas) 
- Other resources (e.g. forests) 
 
 
